Voluntary Desegregation Measures Aimed at Achieving a Diverse Student Body Lose Ground in \u3ci\u3eWessmann v. Gittens\u3c/i\u3e, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) by Vering, Karey A.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 79 | Issue 2 Article 7
2000
Voluntary Desegregation Measures Aimed at
Achieving a Diverse Student Body Lose Ground in
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998)
Karey A. Vering
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Karey A. Vering, Voluntary Desegregation Measures Aimed at Achieving a Diverse Student Body Lose Ground in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), 79 Neb. L. Rev. (2000)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol79/iss2/7
Note*
Voluntary Desegregation Measures
Aimed at Achieving a Diverse
Student Body Lose Ground in
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d
790 (1st Cir. 1998)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 486
II. Wessmann v. Gittens .................................. 487
A. Background ....................................... 487
1. Affirmative Duties to Desegregate .............. 487
2. Constitutional Analysis of Voluntary
Desegregation Measures ....................... 489
a. Strict Scrutiny ............................. 489
b. Compelling Governmental Interest:
Diversity? ................................. 490
c. Narrow Tailoring .......................... 492
B. Facts ..................................... 493
C. First Circuit Court of Appeals Opiion ............. 496
1. Strict Scrutiny ................................. 496
2. Compelling Governmental Interests ............ 496
a. Diversity .................................. 496
b. Remedying Past Discrimination ............ 499
3. Narrow Tailoring .............................. 502
4. Circuit Judge Boudin's Concurrence ............ 504
5. Circuit Judge Lipez's Dissent .................. 504
III. Analysis: The Trend Away From Voluntary Affirmative
Measures to Desegregate Public Schools ............... 505
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEw.
Karey A. Vering, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, B., 1998; University of
Nebraska College of Law, J.D. expected, May 2001 (NEBRASKA LAw REVIEw,
Editor-in-chief, 2000). The author would like to thank Professor Susan Poser for
suggesting this intriguing topic and providing many helpful insights and
discussions.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
A. Wessmann's Impact on Voluntary Affirmative
Desegregation Measures ........................... 505
B. The Future of Affirmative Desegregation
M easures ......................................... 511
IV. Conclusion ............................................ 515
I. INTRODUCTION
Public school desegregation, initiated over fifty years ago, has had
a profound impact on American schools and students. Although de
jure segregation is largely a thing of the past, a problem remains with
de facto segregation in public schools. Achievement gaps and socioeco-
nomic differences between students of different racial and ethnic
backgrounds may indicate that eliminating dejure segregation did not
eradicate the overall problem of segregation. These concerns, coupled
with a desire to achieve racial and ethnic diversity in public schools,
have compelled many school districts to enact measures intended to
help minority students by controlling the ratio of minority students in
schools through admissions and transfer policies. Courts have struck
down many of these policies, however, as violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection clause. According to these courts, the
goal of creating diversity alone does not provide the required compel-
ling interest to support the use of race as a determinative factor in
accepting or rejecting a student.
Wessmann v. Gittensl demonstrates the current judicial trend
away from affirmative measures intended to racially and ethnically
integrate public elementary and secondary schools. Wessmann found
that the Boston Latin School's ("BLS") admissions policy offended the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantee by using race as
a determining factor in the admission standards for half of each enter-
ing class. 2 Despite a documented achievement gap between students
of different races, the Wessmann court found that affirmative mea-
sures to ensure diversity among the student body and remedy vestiges
of past discrimination did not justify the BLS admissions policy. Addi-
tionally, a series of recent federal court decisions appear to greatly
limit and diminish the movement toward voluntary public school de-
segregation that started with Brown v. Board of Education.3
The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny when reviewing federal,
state, or local affirmative action programs by requiring race-conscious
policies to further a compelling governmental interest and be nar-
1. 160 F.3d 790 (1 t Cir. 1998).
2. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808-09 (1' Cir. 1998); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.").
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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rowly tailored to serve that interest.4 Though the Court has issued no
majority decision on whether diversity qualifies as a compelling gov-
ermental interest, it does impose a high threshold evidentiary re-
quirement to prove the necessity of race-conscious school policies
when the policies are in place to remedy vestiges of past
discrimination.
In the face of courts' rulings in favor of white plaintiffs claiming
equal protection violations, public schools may have to relinquish at-
tempts to affirmatively desegregate and diversify their schools. Al-
though a more intermediate level of judicial scrutiny could be the
answer, "diversity" can be defined too many ways to be narrowly tai-
lored without finding specific de jure segregation. School boards
searching for solutions to achievement gap and de facto resegregation
problems, may in the future have to use student economic status
rather than race as an element in admissions and transfer policy
decisions.
Section II.A of this Note provides the legal background of desegre-
gation law, affirmative action law, and the strict scrutiny standard.
Sections II.B and I1.C summarize the facts of Wessmann v. Gittens
and analyze the First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion. Section III.A
outlines and analyzes the impact of recent court decisions that have
ruled primarily against voluntary affirmative measures to desegre-
gate public schools, while section III.B examines the future of affirma-
tive measures to desegregate and the possible alternatives for public
schools. Section IV concludes the Note.
II. WESSMAAN V. GITTENS
A. Background
1. Affirmative Duties to Desegregate
The "separate but equal" doctrine mentioned by the Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson5 stated that when different races are pro-
vided with substantially equal facilities, equality of treatment is ac-
corded even though the facilities are separate. Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1)6 overruled this doctrine in the public school con-
text, concluding that
in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we
hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated... are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
4. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Id. at 495.
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Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11)s required school districts
found to be intentionally segregated to desegregate by admitting all
students on a "racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed."9 Brown 11 required every school board operating a segregated
school to "effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system."' 0
The Supreme Court strengthened this mandate with its decision in
Green v. County School Board."1 The New Kent County School Board
claimed to have discharged its obligation to desegregate by adopting a
plan in which students could freely choose which school in the district
to attend.' 2 The Court found, however, that this plan "[ignored] the
thrust of Brown II," which was intended as "a call for the dismantling
of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that com-
plex and multifaceted problems would arise which would require time
and flexibility for a successful resolution."' 3 The free transfer system
implemented by New Kent County's school board was not enough be-
cause Brown H charged school systems "with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch."14
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education'5 dealt with
a school district's difficulties in implementing a court-ordered remedy
fashioned to desegregate the school district. The Court stated that
"problems encountered by the district courts and courts of appeals
make plain that we should now try to amplify guidelines, however in-
complete and imperfect, for the assistance of school authorities and
courts."' 6 Citing Green, the Court found that "[ilf school authorities
fail in their affirmative obligations under [Green], judicial authority
may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable reme-
dies."17 Swann noted that school authorities have the autonomy to
formulate and implement educational policies and could decide, for ex-
ample, that classrooms with a prescribed ratio of white to black stu-
dents reflecting the district-wide proportion would help prepare
8. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Id. at 301.
10. Id.
11. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
12. See id. at 437.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 437-38.
15. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 15.
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students to live in a pluralistic society.' 8 Implementing a policy like
this "is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities;
absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not
be within the authority of a federal court."' 9
The Swann Court, attempting to more specifically define the re-
sponsibilities of school authorities in desegregating schools, dealt with
student assignment and racial quotas. Noting the focused concern in
eliminating the inherent discrimination in dual school systems, the
Court stated that they were not attempting to deal with the "myriad
factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multi-
tude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds."20 Instead, the
elimination of racial discrimination in public schools "should not be
retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the juris-
diction of school authorities."2l Though the Court approved of the
idea of racial quotas as a way to eliminate racial segregation, it found
that "[tihe constitutional command to desegregate schools does not
mean that every school in every community must always reflect the
racial composition of the school system as a whole."2 2 As an interim
corrective measure, the Swann Court ordered a remedial altering of
school zones and busing of students to hasten desegregation.23 Court-
monitored desegregation was to continue in the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg School District, as well as other racially segregated school dis-
tricts until a court found that the district had achieved unitary status.
2. Constitutional Analysis of Voluntary Affirmative
Desegregation Measures
a. Strict Scrutiny
The First Circuit in Wessmann v. Gittens2 4 applied a standard of
strict scrutiny to their review, requiring that the BLS admissions pol-
icy serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.25 The Supreme Court first addressed affirma-
tive action policies in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.26 Although no majority existed to define an appropriate level
of judicial review, Justice Powell's oft-cited opinion encouraged an ap-
plication of strict scrutiny when examining race-conscious policies.
27
18. See id. at 16.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 24.
23. See id. at 27-31.
24. 160 F.3d 790 (1998).
25. See id. at 794.
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. See id. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
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In two subsequent cases, Fullilove v. Klutznick 28 and Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education,2 9 the Court failed to issue a majority opinion
stating an appropriate standard of review, but did have plurality opin-
ions stating that "'[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.' 3o
A majority of the Court in City of Richmond v. J. A Croson Co.31
finally agreed that, based on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of equal protection, all race-based action by state and local govern-
ments, including affirmative action programs, required a strict scru-
tiny review. "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility."32 The majority opinion in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena3 3 strengthened the strict spcrutiny standard by making it
applicable to all race-conscious affirmative actions taken by the fed-
eral government. It also set forth a two-part test to employ strict
scrutiny:
"A free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"
should tolerate no retreat from the principle that government may treat peo-
ple differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons. Ac-
cordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitu-
tional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling gov-
ernmental interests.
3 4
b. Compelling Governmental Interest: Diversity?
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke35 first introduced the idea of di-
versity as a potentially compelling governmental interest. In a frag-
mented opinion, the Supreme Court struck down an admissions
program at the University of California-Davis that considered minor-
ity applications separately for a prescribed number of seats in the
class.36 Though Justice Powell found inherent constitutional
problems with the notion of preferential racial quotas and balanc-
28. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
29. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
30. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
491 (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
31. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
32. Id. at 493.
33. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
34. Id. at 227 (citations omitted) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943)).
35. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
36. See id. at 274-75, 319-20.
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ing,3 7 he proposed that "racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element" in assessing an applicant.38 Focusing on main-
taining the individuality of applicants, Powell recommended that ra-
cial diversity could be considered a "plus" on an application, but it
could not be used to insulate the racially diverse applicant from other
applicants based on their combined qualifications. 3 9 Powell's opinion,
although frequently quoted as authority for diversity as a compelling
governmental interest, was his alone and did not reflect the majority
opinion of the Court. Four other Justices agreed with him that the
admissions program was unconstitutional, but none joined him on his
diversity views.40 Thus, some questions have been raised as to
whether Powell's Bakke opinion about diversity remains a viable pre-
cedent or if it ever even set one.4 1
Some courts have suggested that diversity may qualify as a com-
pelling governmental interest to justify racial classifications only
when used to remedy vestiges of past discrimination. 4 2 In Hopwood v.
Texas,43 the Fifth Circuit soundly rejected Justice Powell's opinion
from Bakke proposing diversity as a compelling governmental inter-
est,44 noting that "the state's use of remedial racial classifications is
limited to the harm caused by a specific state actor."4 5 Hopwood
pointed out that, while no Supreme Court majority has supported di-
37. See id. at 298, 305-09.
38. Id. at 315.
39. Id. at 317.
40. See id. at 408. Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger
agreed with Powell that the admissions program at UC-Davis was unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
41. Wessmann assumed arguendo "that Bakke remains good law and that some itera-
tions of 'diversity'" may be compelling governmental interests. 160 F.3d at 796.
Hopwood v. Texas, however, stated that "Justice Powell's argument in Bakke gar-
nered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the
Court in Bakke or any other case .... Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not
binding precedent on this issue." 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5" Cir. 1996); see also Philip
T. K. Daniel and Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors of My Death Have Been Ex-
aggerated: Hopwood's Error in "Discarding" Bakke, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 391, 417-18
(1999) (arguing that Hopwood overstepped its authority in rejecting Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Bakke and warning of the danger of using Supreme Court deci-
sions about employment-related "remedial" affirmative action cases to decide
issues in the context of higher education).
42. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.& Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating
that unless race-based classifications are reserved strictly for remedial settings,
these classifications may promote, rather than ease, notions of racial inferiority
and hostility).
43. 78 F.3d 932 (5 h Cir. 1996). In Hopwood, a white applicant to the University of
Texas Law School challenged the school's use of racial/ethnic diversity in its ad-
missions process. The Court ruled the policy unconstitutional under equal pro-
tection and held that diversity cannot be used as a compelling governmental
interest to justify the state's use of race-based classifications.
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950.
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versity as a compelling governmental interest, a plaintiff must pre-
sent a "strong basis in the evidence" showing a causal link between
the alleged vestige of past discrimination and state action.46 Hop-
wood and Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission47 are the only opinions from the Circuit Courts of
Appeal to reject diversity as a compelling governmental interest under
the strict scrutiny standard. Other Circuit Courts of Appeal, however,
have never held definitively that diversity could not serve a compel-
ling governmental interest, though they have rejected specific sets of
facts on that basis, usually for failure to establish a causal link be-
tween the specific problem and the race-based remedy.48 Overall,
there is no consensus as to whether diversity in a remedial context (or
any other context) constitutes a compelling governmental interest
under strict scrutiny.
c. Narrow Tailoring
United States v. Paradise4 9 presented the leading test applied by
most courts to assess narrow tailoring, the second element under
strict scrutiny. Paradise examined the use of race-conscious policies
in an Alabama police department's affirmative action hiring and pro-
motion process. In reviewing whether a state's racial classification
was narrowly tailored, the Court considered (1) the efficacy of alterna-
tive race-neutral policies, (2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the
relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population or work force, (4) the
flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal
could not be met, and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third
parties.50 Wessmann did not specifically use the Paradise test since
the policy had already been eliminated under the compelling govern-
mental interest test of strict scrutiny, but Wessmann did provide gen-
eral guidelines to analyze narrow tailoring.
46. Id. at 949-50 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500).
47. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod decided that
fostering "diverse" radio programming content through hiring minorities did not
rise to the level of a compelling governmental interest.
48. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4'h Cir. 1999), cert.
dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch.,
197 F.3d 123 (4e Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000); Wessmann, 160
F.3d 790 (1"t Cir. 1998). None of these Circuit Court cases decided whether or not
diversity could serve a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the race-based policies in question because they were
not narrowly tailored, while the First Circuit determined that the necessary
causal link between the policy and vestiges of past discrimination was not estab-
lished in Wessmann.
49. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
50. See id. at 171.
[Vol. 79:485
2000] VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION MEASURES 493
B. Facts
The Boston school system operates three examination high schools.
Though generally referred to as public high schools, the examination
schools connote not just public secondary education, but college prepa-
ration. BLS, the most prestigious of the three, operates as a college
preparatory school whose graduates compete with nationally-known
preparatory schools for admission into the most competitive and dis-
tinguished colleges and universities in America.51 BLS's impressive
history began in 1635, and its graduates include Cotton Mather, Sa-
muel Adams, Charles Sumner, and John Hancock.52 It has an alumni
association established 150 years ago that has labored to protect the
school's reputation as Boston's finest public secondary school.5 3 Sev-
eral district elementary school programs tailor their curricula to pre-
pare students for the examination school's entrance examination, and
applications exceed seats for admission at BLS.54
In 1974, a federal district court found that the City of Boston,
through its School Committee, violated black students' equal protec-
tion rights by promoting and maintaining a dual school system.55 The
district court found the entire school system liable for de jure segrega-
tion and required BLS to ensure that at least 35% of each entering
class would be composed of Hispanic and African-American stu-
dents.5 6 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 35% "set-
aside as part of a comprehensive plan to ameliorate pervasive and per-
sistent constitutional infirmities throughout the Boston public
schools."5 7 By 1987, the First Circuit found that systematic progress
had been made to desegregate the Boston school system and, "for all
practical purposes, the School Committee had achieved unitariness in
the area of student assignments."5 8 Though the district court relin-
quished control over student assignments, other aspects of the school
system remained under court supervision.5 9
Although Boston's three examination schools were no longer re-
quired by a court-supervised mandate to maintain a 35% set-aside,
they continued the program until Julia McLaughlin challenged the
set-aside's constitutionality in 1995. The district court granted her in-
51. See McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Mass. 1996).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790,792 (1t Cir. 1998) (citing Morgan v. Hen-
nigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 480-81 (D. Mass. 1974)).
56. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 792.
57. Id. (citing Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 425 (11 Cir. 1976)).
58. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 792 (citing Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 326 (1St Cir.
1987)).
59. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 792.
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junctive relief in McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee60 and or-
dered Julia's admission to BLS.61 Though the McLaughlin court did
not overturn the 35% set-aside, they found McLaughlin's case would
likely succeed on the merits.62 The district court also suggested re-
structuring the examination schools' admission process to "assign a
certain percentage of seats in each examination school to each racial
and ethnic group, tailoring the percentages to the relevant qualified
applicant populations and revisiting the policy periodically."63 The
McLaughlin court claimed that the "Supreme Court has endorsed the
[Boston School Committee's] prerogative in this regard,"64 and sup-
ported this assertion with the Supreme Court's mandate in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education65 for schools to affirma-
tively act to end segregation.6 6
After McLaughlin, the Boston School Committee discontinued the
35% set-aside. Concerned that the number of African-American and
Hispanic children enrolled in examination schools would drop without
a predetermined set-aside, the School Committee sought to create a
policy that would address these concerns without violating the consti-
tutional rights of potential applicants.6 7 Thomas Payzant, superin-
tendent of the Boston public schools, commissioned a consulting firm
to research various admissions policies that would affect the racial
and ethnic composition of the examination schools' entering classes.68
Based on the consulting firm's initial findings, School Committee
Chairman Robert Gittens appointed a task force to research and rec-
ommend an admissions policy. After meetings and public hearings,
the task force recommended "Option N50," which the School Commit-
tee ultimately adopted as the examination schools' admissions policy
("the Policy") effective for the 1997-98 school year.69
Under the Policy, students began the examination schools' admis-
sions process by taking a standardized test. A mathematical formula
combined applicants' test scores and grade point average into a com-
posite score. Once ranked by composite score, applicants were as-
signed to the overall applicant pool for the examination schools in
which they indicated interest. To be considered for examination
school admission, a student had to be in the qualified applicant pool
(QAP), which consisted of the top 50% of scores in the overall appli-
60. 938 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mass. 1996).
61. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 792; McLaughlin, 938 F. Supp. at 1018.
62. See McLaughlin, 938 F. Supp. at 1017.
63. Id. at 1016.
64. Id.
65. 402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971).
66. See McLaughlin, 938 F. Supp. at 1016.
67. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 793.
68. See id.
69. See id.
[Vol. 79:485
2000] VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION MEASURES 495
cant pool for each examination school. Half of the available seats for
an examination school's entering class were allocated strictly on merit
in accordance with composite score rank order. The other half were
allocated using "flexible racial/ethnic guidelines." After assigning the
students admitted solely on the basis of composite score rank order,
school officials determined the relative proportions of five racial/ethnic
categories in the remaining pool of qualified applicants (RQAP): white,
black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American. The remaining seats in
each examination school's entering class were then filled in rank order
from the RQAP, with the number of students from each racial/ethnic
category matching the proportion of that category in the RQAP. The
Policy guidelines were such that a member of a certain racial/ethnic
group could be bypassed in favor of a lower-ranking applicant if the
seats allotted for the lower-ranking applicant's racial/ethnic group
had not been filled.70
When Sarah Wessmann applied to enter Boston Latin School in
the fall of 1997 as a ninth-grader, BLS had ninety seats available for
the 1997 ninth grade entering class. Sarah's composite score ranked
ninety-first out of 705 students in the QAP. To fill the first forty-five
seats, BLS expended the top forty-seven applicants on the list, since
two applicants chose to attend different examination schools. Sarah
would have qualified for admission had the rest of the BLS entering
class been selected on composite scores alone. Based on the racial/
ethnic distribution of the RQAP, however, the Policy dictated that the
remaining forty-five seats be allocated to eighteen white students,
thirteen black students, nine Asian students, and five Hispanic stu-
dents. Eleven Black and Hispanic students whose composite scores
ranged between ninety-fifth to 150' displaced Sarah Wessmann and
ten other white students who had higher composite rank scores.7 1
Henry Robert Wessmann, Sarah's father, sued the Boston School
Committee on her behalf in Wessmann v. Boston School Committee,72
alleging that the Policy's racial/ethnic guidelines violated Sarah's
Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection when it prevented
her from gaining admission to BLS.73 The federal district court held
that the School Committee promoted a compelling governmental in-
terest in engineering a diverse student body and remedying vestiges of
past discrimination, and that the Policy created to implement these
interests was tailored specifically enough so as to not offend the Con-
stitution.74 Wessmann appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 793-94.
72. 996 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1998).
73. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794.
74. See id.; Wessmann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. at 132.
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C. First Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
1. Strict Scrutiny
First Circuit Judge Selya wrote the majority opinion in Wessmann
and began his analysis by establishing the standard of review. Apply-
ing Adarand's strict scrutiny standard when examining "'any racial
classification subjecting [a] person to unequal treatment,'" the major-
ity determined that the BLS admissions policy must serve a compel-
ling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest in order to justify the use of racial classifications. 7 5 The Bos-
ton School Committee argued that its Policy deserved a more lenient
standard of scrutiny because it did not constitute a racial quota per se
and the policy neither benefited nor burdened a specific racial group.
The majority answered these arguments by stating, respectively, that
"[a]ttractive labeling cannot alter the fact that any program which in-
duces schools to grant preferences based on race and ethnicity is con-
stitutionally suspect,"76 and "policies cannot be made to depend 'on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.'"77
2. Compelling Governmental Interests
a. Diversity
Compelling governmental interests are not readily identifiable or
definable. The Supreme Court found that race-conscious state action
to eliminate a "continuing legacy of an institution's past discrimina-
tion" comprises a compelling governmental interest, 78 but the "role
model" theory does not.7 9 The School Committee attempted to justify
its policy on the basis of diversity as a compelling governmental inter-
est. After reviewing case decisions suggesting both that "remedying
past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-con-
scious action"80 and that diversity can never be a compelling govern-
mental interest,8 1 the majority determined that no solid consensus
exists on the diversity issue. Thus, assuming arguendo that "some it-
erations of 'diversity' might be sufficiently compelling, in specific cir-
75. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).
76. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
77. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion)).
78. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).
79. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98).
80. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795 (noting that suggestions that diversity is compelling
when used to relieve the effects of past discrimination have been in dictum).
81. See id. (citing Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 (ruling out diversity as a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in the educational context); Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod, 141 F.3d at 354 (ruling out diversity as a compelling governmental inter-
est in the employment context)).
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cumstances," the majority examined the Policy to determine its
propriety as a means to remedy vestiges of past discrimination.82
The majority grappled with the School Committee's alleged justifi-
cations for the Policy on diversity grounds before analyzing the Policy
as a remedy to ease vestiges of past discrimination. The abstract term
"diversity" can be defined in a variety of ways, depending on the con-
text of its use, and the court refused to accept this "malleable" word
alone as a justification for governmentally sponsored race-based clas-
sifications.8 3 The School Committee argued that, based on the affirm-
ative desegregation power granted to school boards in Swann, courts
should defer to school administrators' judgment and discretion to cre-
ate and implement educational policies within this broad power. The
majority rejected this argument, noting that Swann's context differed
greatly because "dual education systems were a reality [at that time]
and efforts to dismantle them were being frustrated by school offi-
cials."84 Additionally, Swann's mandate dealt with remedying consti-
tutional violations; a court must find a constitutional violation before
it can begin dispensing remedies. The majority thus concluded that
the School Committee must offer more than an assertion of its discre-
tion in deciding school policy, namely a constitutional violation for
which race-conscious remedies are justifiable.85
The School Committee's attempted justification of the Policy con-
sisted of "lauding benefits that it ascribes to diversity," such as prepa-
ration for students entering an ethnically and racially diverse society
and an increasingly global interaction between cultures.8 6 This expla-
nation lacked merit, however, because, despite the potential abstract
benefits of a diverse student body, the court must "inquire whether
the concrete workings of the Policy merit constitutional sanction" in
order to determine "whether the Policy bears any necessary relation to
the noble ends it espouses."S7
The Policy considered the second half of BLS' entering class exclu-
sively on the basis of five racial and ethnic groups,SS flying in the face
of Justice Powell's assertion in Bakke that "'diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifica-
tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element.'"8 9 The School Committee argued that the
Policy's race specificity was necessary because diversity at BLS had
82. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796 (assuming that Bakke remains good law).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 796-97.
85. See id. at 797.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 798.
88. See id. at 798. The five groups were black, white, Hispanic, Asian, and Native
American.
89. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
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been achieved in all areas except for race and ethnicity.9 0 But, should
that assertion be true, "the School Committee's argument implodes"
as statistics compiled over a ten-year period showed that under strict
merit-based selection, black and Hispanic students would have com-
prised fifteen to twenty percent of each BLS entering class, and the
total minority percentage would have been substantially greater.9 1
Without an acute variation in minority admissions between a merit-
based approach and the Policy's approach, the majority found that the
Policy "intended mainly to achieve a racial/ethnic 'mix' that is consid-
ered desirable," a technique otherwise known as "racial balancing."92
Despite the School Committee's good intentions to alleviate under-
representation, approving a racial balancing policy "risks setting a
precedent that is both dangerous to our democratic ideals and almost
always constitutionally forbidden."93
The School Committee attempted to link the admirable ideals set
forth in the Policy with racial balancing through the concept of "racial
isolation," the idea that without a certain representation of a particu-
lar racial or ethnic group in any given institution, members of that
racial or ethnic group will find it difficult to express themselves suffi-
ciently.94 The majority regarded this justification suspiciously be-
cause "it assumes that students cannot function or express themselves
unless they are surrounded by a sufficient number of persons of like
race or ethnicity." This position also conceded that the Policy stereo-
typed individual students as products of their race. 95 Furthermore,
the School Committee could not establish a link between the Policy's
proportional representation and the "vigorous exchange of ideas" such
representation supposedly promotes. In sum, the majority rejected
the racial isolation theory because, in light of the Constitution's "gen-
eral prohibition against racial balancing and the potential dangers of
90. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798. The consultant hired to analyze and create po-
tential admissions policies suggested that "all the options would result in sub-
stantial gender, neighborhood, and socioeconomic diversity, but that, unless race
and ethnicity were explicitly factored into the admissions calculus, attainment of
racial and ethnic diversity might be jeopardized." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 799 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).
94. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 799; see also Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (The West Irondequoit Central
School District argued that its race-based transfer policy attempted to reduce or
prevent 'racial isolation,' which state regulations defined as occurring whenever
'a school or school district enrollment consists of a predominant number or per-
centage of students of a particular racial/ethnic group.' The School District
claimed that reducing racial isolation is desirable because it prepares students to
finction in adult society where they will meet people from varied backgrounds, it
promotes tolerance and understanding of others, and governments have a com-
pelling interest in eliminating de facto segregation.).
95. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 799 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)).
[Vol. 79:485
2000] VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION MEASURES 499
stereotyping," school authorities cannot be given the subjective power
to determine what percentage of any given racial or ethnic group must
be present for students of that race or ethnicity to fully express them-
selves. 96 The First Circuit thus did not reject diversity as a compel-
ling governmental interest in general, as did Hopwood and Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod, but it determined only that the concept of di-
versity as implemented through the Policy did not justify a race-based
classification.97
b. Remedying Past Discrimination
The district court accepted the School Committee's argument justi-
fying the Policy as a way to redress vestiges of past discrimination,
but the First Circuit overruled that determination.98 Though govern-
mental bodies have a substantial interest in eradicating the effects of
past discrimination, they must show a strong basis in evidence to
show that past discrimination has resulted in "a current social ill."99
The School Committee, however, disclaimed a need for a strong evi-
dentiary basis because of a permanent injunction issued by the dis-
trict court in 1994, which enjoined the School Committee from
"discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of the public
schools.., and from creating, promoting, or maintaining racial segre-
gation in any school or other faciliy.lo9 The School Committee ar-
gued that this injunction mandated it to remedy racial imbalances
and eliminated the need for "an independent showing of causation."'1o
The majority disagreed that the injunction required affirmative action
on the part of the School Committee; instead, the injunction operated
in a negative manner, forbidding the School Committee from engaging
in discriminatory practices.10 2 The School Committee's affirmative
duty to desegregate ended in 1987 when the district court found that
Boston schools had achieved unitary status in student assign-
ments, 0 3 and no duty exists to maintain certain racial or ethnic per-
centages in school populations. 0 4
96. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 800.
97. See id.
98. See id.; Wessmann, 996 F. Supp. at 131.
99. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 800; see Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
100. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 800-801. The permanent injunction was issued in 1994
pursuant to the First Circuit's instructions in Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st
Cir. 1987).
101. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 800.
102. See id. at 801.
103. See id.
104. See id.; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 32 (stating that school districts have an af-
firmative duty to take action to desegregate schools upon a court finding of de
jure or intentional segregation); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 319-26 (finding
that the Boston city schools had achieved unitary status under court-ordered
desegregation).
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With the permanent injunction argument having failed, the School
Committee had to identify a vestige of past discrimination remaining
in the Boston school system and provide convincing evidence that this
vestige resulted from past de jure segregation. What legally consti-
tutes a vestige of past discrimination remains unsettled. 0 5 The many
presumptive vestiges found by the Supreme Court in Greeni0 6 have
been adapted into less specific elements, including "quality of educa-
tion."1o7 The School Committee presented a documented "achieve-
ment gap" between black and Hispanic students on one hand and
white and Asian students on the other as its vestige of past discrimi-
nation. The Court, making a fact-sensitive inquiry into the argu-
ment,' 0 8 required evidence of a causal connection between the
achievement gap and past discrimination, assuming arguendo that
such a gap "may act as an indicator of a diminution in the quality of
education."' 0 9
The achievement gap, presented in terms of relative performance
on standardized tests over the years, showed that white and Asian
students had scored significantly higher, on average, than black and
Hispanic students. According to the School Committee's theory, the
achievement gap had led to fewer black and Hispanic applicants to
BLS than if the gap did not exist and, further, those black and His-
panic students that did apply qualified for admission in "abnormally
small" numbers."l 0 The Court eliminated the School Committee's at-
tempted parallel between employment discrimination cases and the
education arena, stating that no "barrier to entry" argument upon
which employment discrimination cases rely existed with the BLS Pol-
icy.'' The achievement gap statistics themselves must "specifically
point.to other allegedly discriminatory conduct in order to suggest a
causal link between those discriminatory acts and the achievement
gap."i i 2 The majority noted that the achievement gap documentation
alone did not eliminate the possibility of causation from societal dis-
crimination and cited Croson in its observation that low minority
membership, "standing alone, cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.""i 3
To support its achievement gap argument, the School Committee
utilized testimony from Dr. William Trent, a sociologist who per-
105. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 801.
106. 391 U.S. at 435. The "Green factors" include student assignments, faculty, staff,
facilities, transportation, and extra-curricular activities. See id.
107. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 801 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992)).
108. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 802.
109. Id. at 801.
110. See id. at 803.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 803-04 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 503).
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formed extensive studies regarding teacher attitudes and student
achievement in the Kansas City school system.11 4 Dr. Trent claimed
that low teacher expectations with regard to black and Hispanic stu-
dents are attitudinal remnants of the segregation era and create a sys-
tematic phenomenon that relegates these minority students to lower
achievement scores. Despite Dr. Trent's "consistent" findings between
patterns in Kansas City and Boston, the majority struggled with his
reliance on evidence from one locality to establish conclusions about
the lingering effects of discrimination in another.1i 5 The majority
cited Croson's warning to "resist attempts to substitute speculation
about correlation for evidence of causation," and noted that, before
adopting a remedy, the discrimination must be identified with speci-
flcity.116 Dr. Trent admitted on cross-examination that his conclu-
sions about teacher expectations in the Boston school system were not
scientifically gathered, but they were based instead on his review of
achievement gap statistics, teacher seniority statistics, and anecdotal
evidence from school officials about teacher attitudes. 1i7 Social scien-
tists are required to apply the same intellectual rigor to the task of
testifying in court that they bring to other professional settings, 1'3
and the court found that Dr. Trent failed to do so in this case.11 9
Dr. Trent's reliance on anecdotal evidence presented an additional
dilemma because anecdotal evidence does not lend itself to proving the
pervasiveness of a problem.' 20 Deputy Superintendent Janice Jack-
son provided the most specific expert testimony as to low teacher ex-
pectations. Her findings were based on her classroom observations as
a "blind researcher" before joining the school system and on additional
observations made once she became deputy superintendent. Ms. Jack-
son testified that she noticed teachers treating minority and non-mi-
nority students differently by, among other things, calling on one set
of pupils but not another, giving disparate reprimands for the same
behavior, and failing to push for "higher order thinking."' 2i The First
Circuit found that, based on Ms. Jackson's failure to quantify her ob-
114. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 804. Dr. Trent concluded from his Kansas City study
that teacher efficacy (success in encouraging students to learn and succeed) cor-
related with higher test scores. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 504); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746
(1974) ("We have never approved the extrapolation of discrimination in one juris-
diction from the experience of another.")
117. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 804-05.
118. See id. at 805 (citing Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
119. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 805.
120. See id. (citing Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9'b Cir. 1991)
("While anecdotal evidence may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimina-
tion, rarely, if ever, can such evidence show a systematic pattern of discrimina-
tion necessary for the adoption of an affirmative action plan.")).
121. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 806.
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servations, "the district court could not validly conclude that the num-
ber of 'problem' teachers she observed was statistically significant"
and that anecdotal evidence of that nature rarely provides a suffi-
ciently strong basis in evidence.122
The majority dismissed additional anecdotal evidence upon which
the dissent heavily relied because "[omne cannot conclude from the iso-
lated instances that these witnesses recounted that low teacher expec-
tations constitute a systematic problem... or that they necessarily
relate to the dejure segregation of the past."123 Generalizations about
socialization, as exemplified by the testimony of Superintendent
Thomas Payzant, also failed to persuade the majority. Payzant testi-
fied that since twenty-eight percent of the Boston school system
faculty had begun teaching in the era of dual school systems, they had
been "socialized and shaped" by the prevalent attitudes of that time
regarding minority students.124 The majority conceded the potential
truthfulness of this statement, but they found it, like other causal fac-
tors or indications of discrimination cited by the School Committee,
"insufficient either to show ongoing vestiges of system-wide discrimi-
nation or to justify a race-conscious remedy."125 The majority con-
cluded that the School Committee provided no evidence to show that
the achievement gap evolved from past school discrimination, since
the gap failed to specify and substantiate the Committee's arguments
and failed to eliminate other potential causal factors.126
3. Narrow Tailoring
The majority asserted that even if the School Committee could es-
tablish a causal connection between the Policy and vestiges of past
discrimination, the Policy could not stand because it swept too
broadly. Race-conscious policies must not only respond to a compel-
ling governmental interest, they must also be narrowly tailored "to
rectify the specific harms in question."X27 Rather than utilizing the
factors of the Paradise test, the Court made three points concerning
the Policy and its lack of narrow tailoring.
122. Id. Ms. Jackson, during her first set of observations, visited six or seven schools
but could only recall the names of two of them. She visited numerous schools
during her second visit as well, but she did not state whether these visits were to
observe teacher treatment of minority and non-minority students or for another
purpose. See id.
123. Id. at 806-07.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (stating that race-conscious remedies must be
so narrowly tailored that there is "little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype")).
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First, since the majority found no barrier to entry at the examina-
tion school level, it failed to see "how the adoption of an admissions
policy that espouses a brand of proportional representation is de-
signed to ameliorate .. . a system-wide achievement gap at the pri-
mary school level."128 The elementary age achievement gap, allegedly
caused by low teacher expectations, bore no connection to flexible ra-
cial/ethnic guidelines in the school system's most prestigious high
schools' admissions policies.
Second, the majority found that "increased admission of black and
Hispanic students cannot be viewed as partial compensation for injus-
tices done at the primary school level."129 The achievement gap af-
fected public school students, yet the Policy applied its racial and
ethnic guidelines to all students seeking BLS admission, including
those black and Hispanic students from private or parochial schools
where there was no evidence of an achievement gap. The Policy did
not suffice to "cur[e] the harm done to the class of actual victims," the
black and Hispanic public school students.1
3 0
Finally, the Policy did not fulfill its own goals in remedying ves-
tiges of past discrimination against historical victims of discrimina-
tion because of its setup. Depending on the distribution of student
scores and racial/ethnic proportions in a given year, a minority stu-
dent could be excluded in favor of a student whose racial group needs
balancing. For example, in 1997, the O'Bryant examination school re-
jected two Hispanic applicants from its ninth-grade class in favor of a
white student.1'3 Additionally, the majority was "unable to compre-
hend the remedial purpose" of admitting Asian students, who have not
historically been subject to discrimination, over higher-ranking white
students.' 3 2 These findings reinforced the majority's view that "in
structure and operation, the Policy indicates that it was not devised to
assuage past harms, but.., it was simply a way of assuring racial/
ethnic balance.., in each examination school class.'13
3
Based on the factual findings, the highly skeptical judicial attitude
towards racial preferences, and the high threshold of evidence re-
quired to sustain racial classifications, the majority found the Policy
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds and ordered the district
court to order Sarah Wessmann's immediate admission to BLS.134
128. Wessmann, 160 F.3d 807 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 808.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 808-09.
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4. Circuit Judge Boudin's Concurrence
Regarding narrow tailoring, the concurrence pointed out the over-
broad and inexplicable granting of preferences to minority groups that
were never discriminated against in the Boston school system, specifi-
cally Asian students and black students from private and parochial
schools.' 3 5 The concurrence also noted that the Policy bears little, if
any, effect on teacher expectations, the supposed origin of residual dis-
crimination, suggesting a "misfit between plan and remedy."'136 Since
the Policy fails to address the problem of discriminatory teacher atti-
tudes, it perpetuates the argument that teacher expectations cause
the achievement gap since "[t]eachers retire slowly and themselves
teach those who succeed them."'137 This does not lend itself to the lim-
ited time and scope of the remedy prescribed by the narrow tailoring
standard. The concurrence did not find these defects of fit surprising
because
the plan is not seriously suited to be a temporary measure to remedy low
teacher expectations.... It is instead a thoughtful effort to assist minorities
historically disadvantaged while, at the same time, preserving the essentially
competitive character of the schools in question. So viewed, there is no misfit
between problem and remedy; the only misfit is with Croson's requirements
for the use of racial preferences, requirements that only the Supreme Court
can relax.
1 3 8
Viewing the narrow tailoring requirement in light of its intent to
assist minorities and preserve the academic integrity of BLS, the con-
currence found that the Policy could have been interpreted to properly
serve those desires. The Policy's use of racial preferences to do this,
however, still did not pass constitutional muster and so the Policy
could not stand.
5. Circuit Judge Lipez's Dissent
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Lipez stated his agreement with the
district court's finding that the Boston School Committee provided
enough evidence to support a compelling governmental interest
through BLS' admissions policy.13 9 In a lengthy discussion, the dis-
sent argued that the majority misapplied the standard of review'
40
and erred in concluding that the School Committee did not offer suffi-
cient evidence to exhibit the continuing effects of past discrimination
that would justify a compelling governmental interest.141 The dissent
asserted that the proper evidentiary standard of review should be a
135. See id. at 809-10 (Boudin, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 810 (Boudin, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 814-820.
141. See id. at 820-828.
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presentation of a prima facie/strong basis in evidence by the defen-
dant, with the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to rebut the prima
facie case.14 2 With this evidentiary setup in mind, the dissent argued
that the plaintiff did not provide satisfactory evidence to rebut the
prima facie case, and the School Committee had met its burden of es-
tablishing a causal link between the achievement gap and past dis-
crimination in the Boston school system.14 3 Noting the Policy's
flexibility and duration,144 fairly insignificant effect on third par-
ties,14 5 and propriety as a measure to remedy the impact of lowered
teacher expectations without addressing the expectations them-
selves,146 the dissent argued that the Policy meets the narrow tailor-
ing requirement as well. The dissent stated that its interpretation of
the standard of review and evidentiary burden should not be charac-
terized as "wishful thinking" by the majority, but instead, it should be
viewed as the proper and accurate interpretation of the evidence
presented to the district court.' 4 7
III. ANALYSIS: THE TREND AWAY FROM VOLUNTARY
AFFIRMATIVE MEASURES TO DESEGREGATE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Wessmann's Impact on Voluntary Affirmative
Desegregation Measures
The First Circuit correctly found that under the strict standard of
review, the BLS admissions policy did not serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, nor was it narrowly tailored. The Boston School
Committee, though it may have presented evidence of vestiges of past
discrimination through the documented achievement gap, failed to
eliminate other socioeconomic factors as possible causes. The Policy's
proponents contradicted their interest in remedying vestiges of past
public school discrimination by failing to narrowly tailor the Policy. A
policy that admits minority private school students or excludes minor-
ity students in favor of white students can hardly serve to remedy a
public school achievement gap. The achievement gap in Wessmann
presents a problem pervasive in American schools that is easy to diag-
nose but difficult to cure because of its complex origins. Though
teacher expectations undoubtedly influence a student's performance,
142. See id. at 818.
143. See id. at 827-828.
144. See id. at 829.
145. See id. at 830.
146. See id. at 833.
147. Id. at 833 (Lipez, J., dissenting); see also id. at 808 ("Our dissenting brother's
valiant effort to read into Croson a broad discretion for government entities pur-
porting to ameliorate past discrimination strikes [the majority] as wishful
thinking.").
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the School Committee's failure to establish causation or vestiges of
past discrimination makes policies based on racial distinctions poten-
tially unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. How can a
court determine causation for an achievement gap for the purposes of
desegregation and affirmative action jurisprudence? The amount of
evidence necessary to prove a connection while eliminating outside
factors has not been defined and appears almost unattainable under
strict scrutiny standards.
Wessmann's foray into the constitutionality of voluntary desegre-
gation measures combines factors from both desegregation law and af-
firmative action. Desegregation law, while relevant to Wessmann's
situation, does not apply well because no dejure segregation or court-
ordered desegregation exists to justify racial classification policies.
While a court can and must order school desegregation where neces-
sary, the issue becomes much murkier when no intentional segrega-
tion or discrimination can be proved. Affirmative action law, derived
from the employment context, supports the idea of bringing in stu-
dents of different racial backgrounds to achieve a diverse population.
The courts, however, have shunned affirmative action of late, except
where clear discrimination or vestiges of past discrimination are read-
ily apparent and supported by a strong basis in evidence. The consti-
tutional standards in this area can be easily articulated, but applying
those principles to a set of facts proves difficult because
by their very nature, racial classifications that treat members of one race dif-
ferently from those of another lend themselves to opposing characterizations;
a benefit that is given to members of one race but not another, no matter how
well-intentioned, can almost always be seen as discriminatory with respect to
the latter group.
14 8
Interpreting Supreme Court cases in this area is difficult because the
cases are fragmented by many opinions, and conflicting opinions exist
even as to the remaining validity of certain decisions or statements
within those decisions.' 4
9
Over forty years ago, starting with Brown and Brown II, courts
began mandating desegregation of schools based on findings of equal
protection violations against minority students under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Courts ordered school districts maintaining a dual
school system to affirmatively desegregate and bring the black and
white populations of their school districts together. Now, however,
non-minority students are the plaintiffs when unitary school districts,
without court orders, maintain race-conscious admissions and trans-
fer policies in an affirmative attempt to achieve de facto desegregation
and diversity in school districts. A series of recent cases illustrate a
148. Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (W.D.N.Y.
1999).
149. See id.
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trend of which Wessmann is a part - schools that, without desegrega-
tion orders, are implementing policies under the auspices of increas-
ing school district-wide diversity. Courts have found, however, that
most of these policies rely too heavily on race as a determining factor
and thus violate equal protection rights of excluded white student-
plaintiffs. Many of these cases share the issue of determining the con-
stitutionality of race-based classifications in a school district not
under court orders to desegregate. Although the facts in each case
differ, the courts have, until recently in the Second Circuit,o5 0 consist-
ently struck down these policies or granted permanent injunctions to
the excluded students because, under the strict scrutiny standard, the
race-based classifications did not serve a compelling governmental in-
terest, nor were they narrowly tailored.
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schoolsi5l dealt with a
magnet school's race-based admissions policy implemented under the
famous Swann desegregation orders, albeit without the requisite judi-
cial approval. The court, after finding that Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools ("CMS") had achieved unitary status and no longer needed to
operate pursuant to the district court's supervision, found that the
magnet school could not sustain its admissions policy without the
court desegregation order. The policy had been implemented while
under court supervision, and thus the court did not examine CMS's
alternative theory that racial diversity qualifies as a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Instead, it found that the program lacked narrow
tailoring. The court stated that since "the remedial justification for
using race-conscious policies is gone, and the district must reevaluate
any continuing use of race in school policy,"152 "CMS's pursuit of di-
versity is... nothing more than a means for racial balancing."153
The Fourth Circuit in Tuttle v. Arlington County School Boardi54
found that a weighted lottery took unconstitutional measures in an
attempt to promote racial diversity among kindergartners admitted
into the school system's three alternative schools. The court assumed
without holding that diversity could be a compelling governmental in-
terest. Since the lottery did not attempt to remedy vestiges of past
discrimination, however, the court went on to determine that the lot-
tery was not narrowly tailored. The court found it "ironic that a Policy
that seeks to teach young children to view people as individuals rather
than members of certain racial and ethnic groups classifies those
150. See infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
151. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
152. Id. at 290.
153. Id. at 292.
154. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 2000 WL 175460 (U.S. March 28,
2000).
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same children as members of certain racial and ethnic groups."' 55
Less than a month later, the Fourth Circuit decided in Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Public SchoolslsS that a school board could not
deny a student's request to transfer to a magnet school because of his
race. Like Tuttle and Wessmann, the court assumed arguendo that
diversity could be a compelling governmental interest. The court only
struck down the racial diversity considerations in the transfer pol-
icy 157 and admitted the student on a preliminary injunction, finding
that since "transfers that negatively affect diversity are usually de-
nied"158 and the school was not attempting to remedy vestiges of past
discrimination, "such nonremedial racial balancing is
unconstitutional."'159
In addition, the conflicts over voluntary desegregation measures in
Boston go beyond Wessmann and the BLS admissions policy. In Bos-
ton's Children First v. City of Boston,160 the District Court of Massa-
chusetts refused to grant a preliminary injunction immediately
eliminating the use of race as a factor in determining student assign-
ments. The court considered the great disruption that would result in
the school system were the injunction to be granted, as well as the fact
that race-based student policies were only in effect through the 1999-
2000 school year. In finding that neither side could conclusively prove
a likelihood of success on the merits, the court noted that "[d]iversity
may well be more important at [an early] stage than at any other -
Kindergarten is when first friendships are formed and important atti-
tudes shaped ... [wihere children first begin to forge social relation-
ships and interactions with their peers, in the view of the Court, the
need of diversity is at its greatest."'l6 Despite the court's idealism,
strict scrutiny and the Wessmann analysis make it likely that a high
evidentiary burden would have been imposed to prove that diversity
served a compelling governmental interest. The Boston School Com-
mittee decided later to eliminate busing as a way of racially integrat-
ing students, and "beginning in fall 2000, Boston's public school
students entering so-called transition grades - kindergarten and first,
sixth and ninth grades - will no longer be denied access to a school in
their neighborhoods based solely on the color of their skin."162
155. Tuttle, at 707.
156. 197 F.3d 123 (4' Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
157. See Eisenberg, at 125. The transfer policy elements that remained intact were
school stability, utilization and enrollment at each school, and the student's rea-
son for the transfer request.
158. Id. at 126.
159. Id. at 131.
160. 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999).
161. Id. at 259.
162. Tom Mashberg, Busing Comes to End of the Road - Race Mix, Economics Change
Hub Since 1974, BOSToN HERALD, Sept. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3407270.
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The preceding cases demonstrate that, as in Wessmann, white par-
ents and students across the country are suing school districts to over-
come the use of racial considerations in school policies designed to
implement diversity or remedy vestiges of past discrimination. By ap-
plying strict scrutiny and generally striking down these policies, the
cases illustrate a trend away from voluntary desegregation measures
implemented by school districts without a court desegregation order.
Because many of these school systems like the one in Wessmann use
policies that are ultimately racial balancing in an attempt to increase
school diversity, the courts strike them down because they do indeed
violate equal protection, no matter how high-minded the intentions to
integrate are. Courts are asking for better, more concrete justifica-
tions of these policies, while parents and students are asking for equal
protection of their constitutional rights.
One Circuit Court of Appeals has questioned the Wessmann deci-
sion and the trend cited above. In Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central
School District,'63 the Western District of New York found unconsti-
tutional a state-funded transfer program that relied exclusively on
race to determine a student's eligibility for transfer. The court left the
transfer policy open for change by the school district, but it granted a
preliminary injunction admitting the student-plaintiff on the likeli-
hood that there was no compelling governmental interest in the pro-
gram's goal of reducing "racial isolation," nor was the program
narrowly tailored to reach such a goal.164 On appeal, however, the
Second Circuit found that the student failed to demonstrate the requi-
site clear likelihood of success at trial to justify a mandatory injunc-
tion, and vacated the district court's order, remanding for a trial on
the merits.165 The Second Circuit criticized the First Circuit's Wess-
mann decision because Wessmann relied on the Supreme Court prece-
dent "which holds merely that absent a finding of a constitutional
violation, a school district is under no obligation, enforceable by a fed-
eral court, to remedy the imbalance."166 An additional factor contrib-
uting to the Second Circuit's Brewer decision was that it, unlike the
First Circuit, had previously held that combating de facto segregation
served a compelling governmental interest.167 The outcome of
Brewer's trial on the merits in the district court, with the Second Cir-
163. 32 F.Supp. 2d 619 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
164. See id. at 631 ("What emerges from the case law, especially the more recent case
law, is the principle that classifications based SOLELY on race, in the absence of
past identifiable discrimination, are almost - if not absolutely - never
permissible.")
165. See Brewer v. West Irondequoit Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 753 (2d Cir. 2000).
166. Id. at 751-52.
167. See id. at 752 (citing Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Andrew Jackson 1") and Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jack-
son High School v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Andrew Jackson IF) as
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cult's precedent in mind, could potentially divide the First and Second
Circuit on the issue of voluntary desegregation measures.
Another interesting exception to the judicial trend against volun-
tary desegregation policies occurred in Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Re-
gents of the University of California,i 6 s where the Ninth Circuit
examined the constitutionality of a research school's race-based ad-
missions policy. The research school, funded by UCLA's Graduate
School of Education and Information Studies, justified its admissions
process with its research goal of improving the quality of education in
California's urban public schools. Under strict scrutiny, the majority
found this to be a compelling governmental interest, 6 9 and they like-
wise found the admissions policy to be narrowly tailored because of
the research necessities for a highly controlled group of students, the
potentially beneficial research results, and the court's deference to the
researchers' needs.-7 0 A vehement dissent stated that the Ninth Cir-
cuit majority failed to "take heed of the Supreme Court's repeated
warnings against allowing the use of racial classifications in non-re-
medial contexts,"1 7 1 and pointed out that "[a] majority of the Supreme
Court has never accepted a non-remedial justification for a racial clas-
sification."1 72 The dissent further denounced the research school's
setup as lacking narrow tailoring and suggested several race-neutral
ways to obtain data about education in urban elementary schools
without discriminating for or against certain students on the basis of
race. 173
The Ninth Circuit's narrow finding in Hunter that research schools
can constitutionally use race as a factor in their admissions process,
despite the interesting contrast it provides, sheds little light on racial
integration of schools as a continuation of desegregation policy. The
current trend of public schools' use of race for mere diversity purposes
or to remedy vestiges of past discrimination holds the spotlight as
courts lift desegregation orders and schools revamp voluntary mea-
sures to achieve a higher level of integration. Schools are ending their
school busing programs and eliminating race-based transfer and ad-
the Second Circuit precedents explicitly establishing that reducing de facto segre-
gation serves a compelling governmental interest).
168. 190 F.3d 1061 (9' Cir. 1999).
169. See id. at 1063-64 (Because "[the challenges posed by California's increasingly
diverse population intensify the state's interest in improving public schools," Cal-
ifornia's interest in operating "a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to
improving the quality of education in urban public schools [serves] a compelling
state interest.").
170. See id. at 1064-67.
171. 190 F.3d at 1067 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1071.
173. See id. at 1078.
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missions policies to comply with court orders or to avoid equal protec-
tion challenges.
As the Boston school system ends its busing program and students
begin attending their walk-to neighborhood schools, school officials
and parents in poorer city neighborhoods worry about a falloff in aca-
demic performance.17 4 Additional concern has been expressed that,
without busing or other race-conscious policies, one-race schools will
reappear with a vengeance because of racial or ethnic concentrations
in certain neighborhoods. After Wessmann, the Boston School Com-
mittee struggled with suggestions for examination school admissions
and general student assignment programs that "ensure diversity in
schools while using formulas that cannot mention race."175 The school
system appears to desire a racially balanced student body, but it must
achieve it through constitutional voluntary desegregation measures.
Superintendent Thomas Payzant has drawn criticism from both mi-
nority and non-minority parents for his proposed student assignment
plan, which gives students a proximity preference in their school of
choice, while eliminating racial and ethnic guidelines. A race-neutral
admissions process to the Boston examination schools has also been
proposed and criticized.176
Federal courts and school districts are gradually abandoning their
mandates for voluntary desegregation. While policies like the one in
Wessmann produce a facially ideal amount of diversity in the student
body, courts strike them down either because they rely too heavily on
race as a factor or because they do not address the source of the
problems which the policies are designed to alleviate. Without a
causal connection between past discrimination and remedy, and with-
out a finding of intentional or de jure segregation, the lower courts'
hands are tied by strict scrutiny. De facto segregation appears immi-
nent in some areas, and this time it is not justified by a "separate but
equal" doctrine that the courts can control. A new solution must be
found, and it must involve more people and resources than a court by
itself can muster and supervise.
B. The Future of Affirmative Desegregation Measures
A rift exists among educators and parents alike over whether de
facto resegregation of public schools needs to be a primary concern
remedied by affirmative measures insuring racial and ethnic integra-
tion. Though "[bilack parents have become much more skeptical that
[busing] is the way of attacking the problem," internal discord of opin-
174. See Mashberg, supra note 162.
175. Beth Daley, New Admission Options Sought for Entry to Exam Schools, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1999, at B4, available in 1999 WL 6082826.
176. See Ed Hayward, Critics Blast Payzant Schools Proposal, BosTON HERALD, Oct.
21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3411252.
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ion in the NAACP has led to the dismissal of two prominent members
"for taking the position that good schools for black students is a higher
priority than racial integration."'177 A "new reality" is emerging as
schools abandon their attempts to voluntarily desegregate: "[e]fforts
to maintain a balance of white and minority students are running
aground on the twin shoals of eroding legal support for such remedies
and dramatically altered demographics."'178 Though integration does
not lack general approval, courts and governments have recently been
limited by strict scrutiny from taking desegregation measures, and
"ethnic segregation now increasingly masks the real story: class segre-
gation."179 Ideas from each side are drawing fire, but many critics,
parents, and educators are encouraging economic and neighborhood
integration policies in schools rather than constitutionally touchy ra-
ciallethnic integration policies.
In public primary and secondary education, the strict scrutiny
standard appears to be stifling earlier Supreme Court orders for
school districts to take affirmative action to desegregate their schools
and eliminate vestiges of past discrimination. Justice O'Connor at-
tempted in Adarand to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact'.. . [t]he unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against mi-
nority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and govern-
ment is not disqualified from acting in response to it."180 Despite the
Supreme Court's intent, the necessity of providing equal opportunities
and equal protection to primary school students of all races makes
strict scrutiny much more difficult to overcome in the public education
context than in an employment or even higher education context.'18
Now that courts are lifting desegregation orders and becoming
more conservative about voluntary race-based integration policies,
strict scrutiny seems to set an impossibly high threshold for public
schools to overcome if they want to implement racial diversity policies.
Though the First Circuit appropriately struck down the BLS Policy,
177. Dirk Johnson, Busing Fading Away as a Means of Integration, THE PATRIOT
LEDGER (Quincy,. Mass.), Sept. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8474684.
178. One by One, Nation's Schools Find New Way to Achieve Diversity: 25 Years After
Busing, 'Economic Integration' Gains Ground, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1999, at 14A,
available in 1999 WL 6853004.
179. Orlando Patterson, Op-Ed: What to Do When Busing Becomes Irrelevant, N.Y.
Tnus, July 18, 1999, § 4, at 17.
180. 515 U.S. at 237 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor went on to note that in
1987, the Supreme Court did find a narrowly tailored race-based remedy that
served a compelling governmental interest in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987).
181. See generally Leland Ware, Tales From the Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the
Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher Education?, 23 J.C. & U.L. 43 (1996)
(describing the history of strict scrutiny, its effects on higher education admis-
sions policies, and the costs of affirmative action).
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the dissent's tortuous interpretation of O'Connor's concurrence in
Croson, struggling to prove that strict scrutiny is too strict in Wess-
mann, does not lack merit. The public school context differs greatly
from the employment arena and even from colleges and universities
with developed affirmative action standards, perhaps even to a point
that a different, lesser standard of scrutiny would be appropriate.1 S2
Courts' narrow focus on the specific issues in each case does not
permit them to resolve the diversity and integration issues encom-
passing public elementary and secondary schools, and not just because
of strict scrutiny. Courts merely glimpse the issues through specific
fact patterns of cases. Limited by the overlapping principles of deseg-
regation, affirmative action, and strict scrutiny, they are forced to deal
with questions better left to school administrations, communities, and
legislators. How can schools racially integrate students without vio-
lating equal protection? Will greater racial integration among stu-
dents solve de facto segregation problems? How do you remedy aminority achievement gap without discriminating against students
not affected by the gap? As long as school districts continue to imple-
ment policies that classify students on the basis of race, and as long as
plaintiffs sue the school districts, courts will to have to answer under
the strict scrutiny test. Many courts, in cases like Wessmann, de-
clined to decide whether diversity could serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, assumed diversity was compelling absent a contrary
decision, and found either no provable vestiges of past discrimination
or that the policy in question was not narrowly tailored.
Waiting for the judiciary to decide whether or not diversity quali-
fies as a compelling governmental interest or waiting for a less strict
standard of review to emerge will take too long. As the courts battle
among these issues and strike down policies brought into question by
students claiming equal protection violations, greater limitations are
placed upon what school districts can do to level the field between stu-
dents on either side of the issue. Courts do not possess the resources
or the power to make the immediate changes needed to salvage the
education of students currently in the system and on the down side of
an achievement gap. Supreme Court Justice Thomas has articulated
this idea:
Federal courts do not possess the capabilities of state and local governments
in addressing difficult educational problems. State and local school officials
not only bear the responsibility for educational decisions, they also are better
equipped than a single federal judge to make the day-to-day policy, curricular,
and funding choices necessary to bring a school district in compliance with the
Constitution. Federal courts simply cannot gather sufficient information to
182. An exploration of the possibilities for intermediate scrutiny is, unfortunately, be-
yond the scope of this note.
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render an effective decree, have limited resources to induce compliance, and
cannot seek political and public support for their remedies.
18 3
Perhaps desegregation and integration are not the most appropriate
ways to deal with integration and achievement gap problems. As
mentioned above, many school officials, parents, and social scientists
favor economic integration over racial integration, in part because it
poses fewer constitutional problems. Justice Thomas stated that since
"desegregation has not produced the predicted leaps forward in black
educational achievement, there is no reason to think that black stu-
dents cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own
race as when they are in an integrated environment."1s 4
But schools, parents, and students will not be so quick to sacrifice
the intrinsic benefits that stem from interactions between students of
different races, ethnicities, and backgrounds. Thomas' position also
fails to consider the potential long-term societal problems of regres-
sion into de facto segregated schools. Perhaps a focus on eliminating
poverty and socioeconomic differences among schools, if not students,
would better assure that schools are doing all they can to equalize op-
portunities for students attending different schools. It appears that at
some point, some students will have to be favored over others in order
to give disadvantaged students full ability to maximize their potential
to learn and succeed. But courts will not favor those students based
merely on their race. Even with this country's embarrassing and in-
vidious history of slavery, prejudice, discrimination, and segregation,
a court's capacity to assist minority students is limited by previous
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause. Whether socioeconomic differentiation of students will be sub-
ject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny remains to be seen, but it ap-
pears acceptable based on the durability of need-based financial aid
programs and programs allowing discounted or free school lunches for
economically disadvantaged students.
The late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, a Third Circuit Court of
Appeals judge, noted in response to the political and judicial assault
on affirmative action and equal educational opportunity that "this
country seems intent on returning to the foolishness of the past."'8 5
How can a school district strike a balance between remedying an
achievement gap while not denying equal protection to those students
who are not affected by the gap? The Policy at issue in Wessmann
misplaced its emphasis on BLS admission rather than going to the
183. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131-32 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
184. Id. at 121-22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
185. Pace Jefferson McConkie, Race and Higher Education: A Rallying-Cry for Racial
Justice and Equal Educational Opportunity, 21 U. Atm LrrLE RoCK L. Rav. 979,
992 (1999).
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source of the alleged vestiges of past discrimination. Suggestions that
the School Committee parcel out examination school admissions to
historically underrepresented public elementary schools may pass
constitutional muster but still fail to address the achievement gap
problem appropriately.' 8 6 Courts have the ability to provide a quick
fix with intermediate scrutiny, but constitutional de facto segregation
solutions will have to start at the school district and neighborhood
level. In light of the judicial trend away from voluntary desegregative
measures, school boards must develop more complex and creative poli-
cies to improve the quality of education for all students. Attempts to
achieve facial diversity within the schools and hopes that integration
will solve problems like the achievement gap have not produced the
desired results.
Affirmative desegregation measures need to focus away from race
to remain within constitutional bounds. Basing school district policies
on economic status rather than race may help in alleviating many
school problems while not unconstitutionally focusing on a student's
race or ethnicity. Since problems like the achievement gap still exist
despite years of desegregation, perhaps schools need to try something
new. The evidentiary standards imposed under strict scrutiny in
cases like Wessmann make it nearly impossible for schools to constitu-
tionally use racial classifications in their policies. Though a lower
standard of scrutiny may be appropriate, this solution cannot be im-
mediately achieved - courts must decide as this area of law grows.
Courts must recognize that, when dealing with affirmative desegrega-
tion measures in public elementary and secondary schools, neither de-
segregation law nor affirmative action law applies in a fully relevant
manner. With the current conservative trend in the judiciary, courts
may avoid making activist decisions, and students may pass through
increasingly segregated public school systems that cannot implement
race-based policies to alleviate potential problems, such as achieve-
ment gaps between black and Hispanic students and white and Asian
students. School systems like the one in Wessmann should implement
policies that address the sources of these problems rather than their
later manifestation. One way to do this is by implementing economic
integration policies into student assignment, transfer, and admissions
policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems in education are too complex and indefinite to be at-
tributed only to schools and their treatment of students, especially as
the reality of dual school systems and de jure segregation recede into
186. See Preston Green, May Examination Schools Use Racial Preferences in Their
Admissions Process?: Wessmann v. Gittens, 135 ED. LAw. REP. 873 (1999).
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the past. Attempts by school districts to give historically disadvan-
taged students a boost and encourage interaction between students of
all races are admirable but overly idealistic and potentially unfair to
those students not historically disadvantaged. Though achievement
gaps may be attributable to past discrimination, a school system will,
after Wessmann, have a difficult time tying the plan of remedy to the
ultimate problem. Unless these attempts to overcome vestiges of past
discrimination are fully justifiable as mandated by Wessmann and de-
cisions like it, they are not constitutionally appropriate and unfairly
restrain the rights of students who have not been discriminated
against in the past. "Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful
racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitu-
tion, there can be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor race."1 8 7
In light of these equal protection issues, courts should realize that
decisions dealing with voluntary desegregation policies are neither de-
segregation nor affirmative action cases, and decide accordingly. But
changing the tide will take time; school districts need a solution now.
With the current judicial trend away from upholding race-based mea-
sures to affirmatively integrate schools, school districts must attempt
to implement more creative policies to make each student's schooling
truly equal on a substantive, not merely facial, level. Treating stu-
dents as individuals speaks to the ultimate purpose of Brown v. Board
of Education; schools should thus avoid basing decisions about stu-
dents on the particular student's race or ethnicity. Until the Supreme
Court rules whether diversity can be a compelling governmental issue
under strict scrutiny, or until the judiciary relaxes the strict scrutiny
standard in the context of public schools that implement affirmative
desegregative measures, school districts should consider administer-
ing policies that take a student's economic background into considera-
tion. The ultimate goal of these policies will still be to give equal
opportunity to students of all races in the spirit of desegregation that
has, as of yet, failed to produce the desired results.
Karey A. Vering
187. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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